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COMPUTATIONAL NEUROSCIENCE
A convergence of evidence offers an answer. In neuronal net-
works with extensive intrinsic connectivity, integration times are 
determined by network dynamics (Usher and McClelland, 2001; 
Wang, 2002, 2008; Wong and Wang, 2006). Control of these dynam-
ics is therefore a potential means of trading speed and accuracy. 
Gain modulation offers a means of control, where the magnitude of 
the neural response to sensory evidence changes as a function of a 
second input signal (Salinas and Thier, 2000; Salinas and Sejnowski, 
2001). We propose that the neural encoding of elapsed time (Leon 
and Shadlen, 2003; Janssen and Shadlen, 2005; Genovesio et al., 
2006; Mita et al., 2009) provides this second input.
We model a decision circuit in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) 
of posterior parietal cortex with a recurrent network model. We 
choose LIP because this area is extensively correlated with deci-
sion making (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Huk and Shadlen, 2005; 
Thomas and Pare, 2007; Churchland et al., 2008), gain modulation 
(Andersen and Mountcastle, 1983; Andersen et al., 1985), and the 
encoding of temporal intervals (Leon and Shadlen, 2003; Janssen 
and Shadlen, 2005). In simulations of a decision task, the respon-
siveness of the network is modulated by an increasing function 
of time, referred to as the buildup of urgency (Churchland et al., 
2008; Cisek et al., 2009). Across all task conditions, network acti-
vation reaches a fixed threshold at decision time, consistent with 
neural data (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Huk and Shadlen, 2005; 
Churchland et al., 2008). Our results are explained by network 
dynamics. As urgency builds up, the network progresses through a 
series of processing stages supporting noise filtering, integration of 
evidence, amplification of integrated evidence, and choice selection. 
The rate of urgency buildup controls the rate of this progression 
and consequently the SAT.
1 IntroductIon
Subjects in decision making experiments trade speed and accuracy 
at will (van Veen et al., 2008). Under otherwise identical conditions, 
they make faster, less accurate decisions when motivated to favor 
speed, and make slower, more accurate decisions when motivated 
to favor accuracy. The speed–accuracy trade-off (SAT) is ubiquitous 
across decision making paradigms, but while the neural mecha-
nisms underlying decisions are generally well characterized (Gold 
and Shadlen, 2001; Schall, 2001), the neural basis of the SAT is an 
open question (Gold and Shadlen, 2002).
Experimental and theoretical work indicates that decisions result 
from mutual inhibition between neural populations selective for 
each option of a decision (see Gold and Shadlen, 2007), where 
intrinsic (recurrent) synapses support the integration of evidence 
over time (Usher and McClelland, 2001; Wang, 2002). Mutual inhi-
bition ensures that the representation of evidence accumulating in 
each population comes at the expense of evidence accumulating in 
the other(s), implementing a subtractive operation (see Smith and 
Ratcliff, 2004; Bogacz, 2007). This neural framework instantiates 
a class of algorithms frequently referred to as the drift diffusion 
model (DDM), known to yield the fastest decisions for a given level 
of accuracy and the most accurate decisions for a given decision 
time (see Bogacz et al., 2006). Speed and accuracy can be traded 
in the DDM by adjusting the level of evidence required for a deci-
sion (the decision threshold; Gold and Shadlen, 2002). Empirical 
studies, however, indicate that decision-correlated neural activity 
reaches a fixed threshold at decision time (Hanes and Schall, 1996; 
Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Churchland et al., 2008). How, then, 
can the SAT be accomplished by neural populations with a fixed 
decision threshold?
Gain modulation by an urgency signal controls the  
speed–accuracy trade-off in a network model of a cortical 
decision circuit
Dominic Standage1*, Hongzhi You2, Da-Hui Wang2 and Michael C. Dorris1
1 Canadian Institutes of Health Research Group in Sensory-Motor Integration, Department of Physiology, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada
2 Department of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
The speed–accuracy trade-off (SAT) is ubiquitous in decision tasks. While the neural mechanisms 
underlying decisions are generally well characterized, the application of decision-theoretic 
methods to the SAT has been difficult to reconcile with experimental data suggesting that decision 
thresholds are inflexible. Using a network model of a cortical decision circuit, we demonstrate 
the SAT in a manner consistent with neural and behavioral data and with mathematical models 
that optimize speed and accuracy with respect to one another. In simulations of a reaction time 
task, we modulate the gain of the network with a signal encoding the urgency to respond. As 
the urgency signal builds up, the network progresses through a series of processing stages 
supporting noise filtering, integration of evidence, amplification of integrated evidence, and 
choice selection. Analysis of the network’s dynamics formally characterizes this progression. 
Slower buildup of urgency increases accuracy by slowing down the progression. Faster buildup 
has the opposite effect. Because the network always progresses through the same stages, 
decision-selective firing rates are stereotyped at decision time.
Keywords: decision making, speed–accuracy trade-off, gain modulation, urgency, neural model, recurrent network
Edited by:
Ken Miller, Columbia University, USA
Reviewed by:
Surya Ganguli, University of California, 
USA
Philip Holmes, Princeton University, 
USA
*Correspondence:
Dominic Standage, Queen’s University, 
Botterell Hall, Room 453, Kingston, 
ON, Canada K7L 3N6.
e-mail: standage@biomed.queensu.ca
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 7 | 1
Original research article
published: 11 February 2011
doi: 10.3389/fncom.2011.00007
2 MaterIals and Methods
A cortical decision circuit was simulated with a network from a class 
of models widely used in population and firing rate simulations 
of cortical circuits (Wilson and Cowan, 1973; Pouget et al., 2000; 
Douglas and Martin, 2007), including feature maps in V1 (Ben-
Yishai et al., 1995), posterior parietal cortex (Salinas and Abbott, 
1996; Standage et al., 2005), frontoparietal cortex (Cisek, 2006), 
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Camperi and Wang, 1998). 
The model assumes a columnar organization, where intercolum-
nar interactions are characterized by a smooth transition from net 
excitation between adjacent columns to net inhibition between 
distal columns, furnishing a continuum of overlapping on-center, 
off-surround population codes (see Figure 1).
The model is constrained by signature characteristics of neural 
and behavioral data from visuospatial decision making experi-
ments. The neural data we consider were recorded in LIP, but 
similar activity is seen in other decision-correlated cortical areas, 
e.g., the frontal eye fields (see Schall, 2002). These characteristics 
are (1) decision- correlated neural activity showing an initial “fea-
tureless” response (equal magnitude regardless of feature value) 
followed by a decline in the rate of activity, competitive interac-
tions, and a stereotyped excursion of the “winning” representation 
(e.g., Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Sugrue et al., 2004; Ipata et al., 
2006; Thomas and Pare, 2007; Churchland et al., 2008); (2) a 
fixed level of decision-selective activity at the time of the decision 
(e.g., Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Churchland et al., 2008); and 
(3) psychometric and chronometric curves, where accuracy and 
decision time decrease and increase respectively as a  function of 
task difficulty (see Section 3.1 and Figure 3) and decision times 
are in the hundreds of milliseconds range (e.g., Roitman and 
Shadlen, 2002; Palmer et al., 2005; Churchland et al., 2008; Shen 
et al., 2010). In the context of cortical processing, the first of 
these characteristics corresponds to a transition from feedfor-
ward dominance to feedback dominance, hypothesized to be a 
fundamental principle of local-circuit cortical processing (see 
Douglas and Martin, 2007). As we will see, the rate of this tran-
sition controls the SAT in our model. The second characteristic 
provides the motivation for our study, described above. The third 
characteristic is implicit in the SAT, on the relevant timescale for 
perceptual decisions.
We simulated a two-choice visual discrimination task by provid-
ing two noisy inputs to the model for 1000 ms. The task was to dis-
tinguish the stronger input (the target) from the weaker input (the 
distractor). While the spatial and temporal profiles of the inputs 
were constrained by the above data, the task clearly generalizes to 
other decision tasks, just as the model generalizes to other cortical 
regions. The neural coding of elapsed time (urgency) was simulated 
with a piecewise linear function (Figure 2C), where the slope of the 
function was assumed to reflect subjects’ learned estimate of the 
time available to respond (see Durstewitz, 2004). The activation of 
each column was simulated with sigmoid function of its input. Gain 
modulation was implemented by scaling the slope of the sigmoid 
by the urgency signal during a given trial (Equation 2). As shown in 
Sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, this approach permits an analysis of the 
gain-modulated network in trials without gain modulation, where 
urgency is omitted and the slope of the sigmoid can be set to any 
value spanned by the scaled slope under gain modulation.
We ran 1000 trials across a range of task difficulties and rates 
of buildup of urgency (Section 2.3). Task difficulty was controlled 
by the mean similarity of the input signals, ranging from highly 
distinguishable (90% similar) to indistinguishable (100% similar) 
on average (Equation 4). Ideal observer analysis of a population 
of target and distractor-selective columns was used to determine 
the timing and accuracy of target discrimination on each trial 
(Section 2.4).
2.1 the Model
The network is a fully connected recurrent rate model with N = 100 
nodes, each representing a spatially clustered population of neurons 
with similar response characteristics (effectively, a cortical column). 
The firing rate of each population represents the proportion of 
its neurons emitting a spike at any moment in time (Wilson and 
Cowan, 1972; Gerstner, 2000). The state of each node i = 1:N (col-
umn) is described by
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where the phenomenological state variable v is interpreted as the 
average membrane potential of each neuron in the column (Amari, 
1977; Cremers and Herz, 2002), t
v
 = 20 ms is the average membrane 
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Figure 1 | (A) Fully recurrent network simulating 100 cortical columns. 
Intercolumnar interactions are scaled by down-shifted Gaussian weights W, 
providing local excitation (support), and distal inhibition (competition) between 
columns. Gaussian response fields mediate target (T) and distractor (D) input 
signals. (B) Noisy inputs at the response field centers of the target- (black) and 
distractor-selective (gray) populations. Inset depicts the mean input. (C) Surface 
plot of network activity during the decision task. rT and rD refer to firing rates of 
the target- and distractor-selective populations. Lighter shades correspond to 
higher-rate activity. The state of the network at the end of the trial is shown on 
the right side of the figure.
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The intercolumnar interaction structure W is a Gaussian function 
of the spatial distance between columns arranged in a ring, where 
excitation-dependent inhibition is provided by subtracting a constant 
C from this shift-invariant weight matrix (Amari, 1977; Trappenberg 
and Standage, 2005), depicted in Figure 1A. The strength of interac-
tion between any two columns i and j is thus given by
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(3)
where d = min(|i − j|∆x, 2p − |i − j|∆x) defines distance in the 
ring, ∆x = 2p/N is a scale factor, and g
w
 = 100 determines the 
strength of intrinsic (recurrent) activity. Constants s = 0.75 mm 
and C = 0.5 support population codes consistent with tuning 
curves in visual cortex (Mountcastle, 1997; Sompolinsky and 
Shapley, 1997).
2.2 sIMulated two-choIce decIsIon task
To simulate a reaction time version of a two-choice visual dis-
crimination task, Gaussian response fields (RF) were defined for 
all columns i by RF ei
d= − 2 22/ s , where d and s are given above for 
the intercolumnar interaction structure W. Each column i received 
selective input s s si i
t
i
d= +  for time T = 1 s (the stimulus interval). 
Columns 25 (the target column) and 75 (the distractor column) 
were maximally responsive to si
t  and si
d respectively, i.e., the RF 
centers of the selective inputs were 180° apart in the ring network. 
Spike response adaptation in upstream visually responsive neurons 
was modeled by a step-and-decay function (Trappenberg et al., 
2001; Wong et al., 2007)
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where g
s
 = 75 determines the initial strength of input at the tar-
get and distractor columns, m
div
 = 3 determines the asymptotic 
input strength, t
m
 = 25 ms determines the rate of input decay, and 
t
vrd
 = 50 ms is a visual response delay (Thomas and Pare, 2007). 
Constant g
m
 was set to 1 for the target and to g
ext
 for the distractor, 
where 0.9 ≤ g
ext
 ≤ 1 determined target-distractor similarity. The 
strength of si
t  and si
d  respectively was scaled by RF
i
 at each column 
according to its proximity to the target and distractor columns. In 
noisy simulations, Gaussian noise with mean and SD m was added 
to si
t  and si
d(Salinas and Abbott, 1996). Our use of the same value of 
s for the (extrinsic) RFs and the (intrinsic) lateral interaction struc-
ture W is consistent with the feedforward multiplication of accu-
mulators by Gaussian input signals in the multiple-choice decision 
task of McMillen and Behseta (2010), shown by these authors to be 
required for asymptotically optimal hypothesis testing. Simulations 
were run with Euler integration and timestep ∆t = 1 ms. A 200-ms 
equilibration period was used. Mean input to the target and distrac-
tor columns is shown in Figure 1B.
2.3 GaIn ModulatIon by the urGency sIGnal
The urgency signal was simulated with a piecewise linear function
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time constant, W governs interactions between columns indexed 
by j = 1:N, s is selective input, described in Section 2.2, and h is 
normally distributed random noise with mean m
h
 = −10 and SD 
|m
h
|, determining the rate to which the network relaxes without 
selective input, i.e., the resting state (Amari, 1977; Doubrovinski 
and Herrman, 2009).
The population rate r of each node is related to the state variable 
v by a sigmoid gain function
 
r v t e U t v t( ( )) / ( ( )) ( )= +( )− +1 1 1 b
 
(2)
where b determines the slope of the function, scaled by urgency 
signal U(t) as it builds up on each trial. This scaling causes a pivot 
of the sigmoid around its axis (Figure 2A), but does not shift it 
to the left or right (Chance et al., 2002). The effect of the scaling 
on network activation is shown in Figure 2B. In trials with gain 
modulation, b = 0.0275. In trials without gain modulation (see 
Section 3.1), U = 0 and we refer to the slope parameter of the 
sigmoid as bˆ, corresponding to (1 + U(t))·b at any time t under 
gain modulation.
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Figure 2 | (A) Sigmoid gain function with different values of the slope 
parameter b. Lighter shades of gray correspond to smaller values of b.  
(B) Network response (without gain modulation) to a single stimulus for  
each value of b in (A) above. Curves show network activation at the end 
of the trial. The simulation was identical to the decision task, but noise 
was omitted for clarity and only one stimulus was used, centered on 
column 50 (indicated by the arrow). (C) Urgency signal U(t) building up 
over 1000 ms (solid), 750 ms (dashed), and 500 ms (dotted). Under gain 
modulation, b was scaled by U(t) during each trial (see Equation 2, Section 
2), akin to a transition from light gray to black in (A,B) with increasing 
urgency.
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in terms of the network’s dynamics. Before doing so, it is useful 
to define some terminology. We define the decision variable as 
the difference between the activation of the target and distractor 
columns, and we define the time over which the noise-free model 
can calculate the decision variable as the network’s effective time 
constant of integration t
eff
 (Section 3.3). In Section 3.4, we show 
that as the urgency signal builds up, the network progresses through 
processing stages supporting a range of integration times, domi-
nated by leakage early in each trial and by feedback inhibition later 
on (Usher and McClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al., 2006). The latter 
entails an acceleration of the decision variable, which we refer to as 
amplification. Note that our use of this term refers to the decision 
variable only, not to the network processing more generally. In 
Section 3.5, we show that the within-trial progression from leak-
age to inhibition-dominated processing allows the network to take 
advantage of dynamics inherently suited to different stages of the 
decision process, distinguishing the network from earlier models 
that produced the SAT with a constant within-trial signal (variable 
between blocks of trials). In Section 3.6, we take a dynamic systems 
approach, showing that our numeric explanation corresponds to a 
bifurcation between dynamic regimes. We analytically calculate the 
time constant of the linear approximate system, referred to as t
lin
, 
which undergoes the same qualitative progression as t
eff
 in Section 
3.4. Note that in simulations and analysis without gain modula-
tion, we refer to the network as the fixed-gain network and to the 
slope parameter of its gain function as bˆ. Thus, for a given value 
of urgency U(t) in the gain-modulated network, ( ( ))1+ ∧U t ·b b=  in 
the fixed-gain network. In Section 3.7, we show that the network 
earns more reward per unit time than a fixed-gain network with 
bˆ tuned for best performance.
3.1 speed and accuracy of decIsIons
For all rates of buildup of urgency U, decisions took longer and 
became less accurate with increasing task difficulty. The gain-
modulated network thus produced typical psychometric and 
chronometric curves, demonstrating speed, and accuracy of deci-
sions consistent with behavioral data (e.g., Roitman and Shadlen, 
2002). Longer buildup of U resulted in slower, more accurate 
decisions for a given task difficulty (Figure 3). Under the same 
conditions, shorter buildup resulted in faster, less accurate deci-
sions. The network thus produced the SAT. Of note, with lower 
task difficulty (90–97% similarity), the network showed another 
kind of SAT for all U, maintaining near-perfect accuracy by tak-
ing longer to make decisions as difficulty was increased, a feature 
demonstrated by earlier neural models of decision circuits (Wong 
and Wang, 2006).
3.2 tarGet-selectIve actIvatIon In the network
Consistent with neural data (Hanes and Schall, 1996; Churchland 
et al., 2008), target-selective activation is approximately constant 
at decision time across all task conditions (between 0.365 and 
0.385; Figure 4A). It also reaches a common maximum rate across 
all conditions (Figures 4B,C), as seen in LIP during visual tasks 
(Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Huk and Shadlen, 2005; Churchland 
et al., 2008). These two findings demonstrate a subtle but important 
distinction. We used ideal observer analysis to determine stimulus 
discrimination, so the constant level of activation at decision time 
where U
max
 = 0.5 and t
m
 ∈ {500, 750, 1000} ms determines time over 
which the signal increases toward U
max
, depicted in Figure 2C. Gain 
modulation was implemented by multiplying the slope parameter 
b = 0.0275 of the columnar gain function by 1 + U(t; Equation 
2 above).
2.4 deterMInInG the tIMInG and accuracy of dIscrIMInatIon
Signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966) was used to quan-
tify the degree to which an ideal observer of network activation 
could discriminate the target from the distractor, estimating the 
separation of the distributions of target and distractor-selective 
rates at successive 1 ms intervals. Signal detection theory is com-
monly applied to electrophysiological recordings under conditions 
in which a target stimulus is inside and (on separate trials) out-
side a neuron’s response field, averaged over all trials (Thompson 
et al., 1996; Thomas and Pare, 2007). Because we can observe all 
the activity in the model, we applied this method to a popula-
tion of target and distractor-selective columns on each trial. Each 
population p = 25 included the target and distractor columns plus 
the adjacent 12 ≈ s/2pN columns on each side of these response 
field centers. Receiver operating characteristic curves (ROC) were 
calculated from the mean rates of these populations, determining 
mean discrimination for each level of task difficulty and urgency 
signal U(t). The area under the ROC (AUROC) quantifies the 
separation of the distributions of target and distractor activation 
(see Thompson et al., 1996). The probability of discrimination was 
quantified by a least squares fit of the AUROCs to a cumulative 
Weibull function
 w t c c d e
t a b( ) ( ) ( / )= − − ⋅ −  (6)
where t is the time after stimulus onset, and a, b, c, and d are fit-
ted parameters: a is the time at which the function reaches 63% 
of its maximum, b is the slope (shape parameter), and c and d are 
the upper and lower limits of the function respectively. Parameter 
c quantifies discrimination magnitude and is typically close to 1 
(separate distributions of target and distractor activation at the end 
of a trial), whereas d is typically close to 0.5 (overlapping distribu-
tions at the beginning of a trial, see Figures 4B,C). Because either 
target or distractor activation could dominate the network on any 
given trial (correct and error trials respectively), the AUROCs could 
be fit with increasing or decreasing Weibull functions w. On error 
trials (decreasing function), a in Equation 6 refers to the time at 
which w reached 63% of 1 − min(w), and c and d are the lower and 
upper limits respectively. The time at which w reached 0.75 was 
considered the discrimination time (Thompson et al., 1996; 0.25 
on error trials). The resulting decision times were averaged over 
all trials to determine the speed of decision making for each task 
difficulty and urgency U(t). Trials on which w reached neither 0.75 
nor 0.25 were considered “no decision” trials.
3 results
We begin the Section 3 by showing that gain modulation of the 
network by a growing urgency signal produces the SAT (Section 
3.1), where decision-selective activation at decision time is approxi-
mately constant across all task conditions, referred to as reaching a 
fixed threshold (Section 3.2). We subsequently explain these results 
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account for the SAT with a fixed threshold, whether a downstream 
network is reading out the modulated network or if the modulated 
network has the “final say” on the decision itself. Using a constant 
threshold to determine speed and accuracy produced similar results 
to those produced by ideal observer analysis (not shown).
3.3 the effectIve tIMe constant of InteGratIon of the network
The time over which a recurrent network can accumulate evidence 
(its effective time constant of integration t
eff
) can be controlled by 
parameters determining the strength of network dynamics (Wang, 
2002; Wong and Wang, 2006). Above and below an optimal regime, 
t
eff
 is progressively shortened (Wang, 2008), dominated by amplifi-
cation and leakage of accumulated evidence respectively (Usher and 
McClelland, 2001). Larger values of t
eff
 favor accuracy because the 
network can accumulate evidence for longer. Smaller values favor 
speed. The ability of the network to trade speed and accuracy as 
a function of urgency can thus be understood by considering the 
effect of urgency on its integration time.
We approximated t
eff
 under gain modulation by running a noise-
free trial for each U and task difficulty. In each of these trials, we 
integrated the difference between the firing rates at the target and 
distractor columns, where t
eff
 was the time at which this difference (the 
decision variable) stopped growing (precision 10−6). Longer buildup 
of U yielded longer integration times (Figure 5A). Target-selective 
rates reached a stereotyped maximum (∼0.85) at t
eff
 for all U and task 
difficulties. These results are not surprising after the results shown in 
Figures 3 and 4, but they demonstrate an important principle: slower 
(faster) buildup of U facilitated longer (shorter) accumulation of evi-
dence under gain modulation, precisely the requirement for the DDM 
to trade speed and accuracy. We build on this principle below.
demonstrates that a downstream network could employ a fixed 
threshold when making decisions based on network activity (e.g., 
the superior colliculus reading out LIP activity). The stereotyped 
maximum rate of selective activation demonstrates that the net-
work could also employ a fixed threshold to make decisions on its 
own, i.e., without an observer of its activity. Our results therefore 
demonstrate that gain modulation by the encoding of urgency can 
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Figure 4 | Target-selective activation at decision time is approximately 
constant (A) and reaches a stereotyped maximum (B,C) across all task 
difficulties and rates of buildup of U. Solid, dashed, and dotted curves 
correspond to U building up over 500, 750, and 1000 ms respectively (see 
Figure 2C). (A) Target-selective rates at discrimination time on correct trials for 
all task difficulties and buildup of U, determined by ideal observer analysis 
(see Section 2). (B) Mean activation over the target and distractor populations 
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(A) Solid, dashed, and dotted curves show teff for urgency buildup over 1000, 
750, and 500 ms respectively. Slower buildup yields longer teff. (B) For all 
distinguishable tasks (gext < 1) in the fixed-gain network (no gain modulation), 
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of gray show that this effect is more pronounced with increasing task 
difficulty, where lighter shades correspond to easier tasks.
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task for different values of bˆ. Mean activation over the target and 
distractor populations on a noise-free trial is shown for one task 
difficulty (97% similarity) in Figure 6. With low gain, the network 
distinguishes one signal from the other, but cannot accumulate 
much of the difference between the signals as the trial progresses 
(Figure 6B, lightest gray curves). As such, the network is capable 
of functioning as a noise filter, recognizing a difference between 
input signals, but leakage and inhibition are soon balanced (Usher 
and McClelland, 2001). With increased gain, the network integrates 
the difference between signals over the full trial, approximating 
the DDM, as evidenced by the near-linear increase of the decision 
variable (medium gray). With a further increase in gain, the net-
work amplifies an integrated difference between inputs (dark gray). 
With high gain, the network quickly amplifies a small difference, 
demonstrating dynamics suitable for categorical choice (black). The 
precise correspondence between the slope parameter bˆ of the gain 
function and each of these stages depends on the mean difference 
between signals, but other task difficulties yield similar curves.
Whereas the fixed-gain network implements a single regime 
for each value of bˆ, the gain-modulated network transitions 
through these regimes on each trial, where the rate of transition 
is determined by the timecourse of the urgency signal U. Thus, 
with gain modulation, the network smoothly progresses through a 
series of processing stages implementing noise filtering, difference 
integration, difference amplification, and selection. As such, the 
network begins each trial conservatively (dominated by leakage), 
but becomes less so as information is accumulated. The slower the 
buildup of U, the longer the network spends in more conservative 
stages, enabling higher accuracy at the expense of speed. This pro-
gression is depicted by the vertical arrow in Figure 6B. The outcome 
of the different rates of progression can be seen in the mean target 
and distractor-selective activation under gain modulation shown 
in Figures 4A,B, where activation diverges more slowly with slower 
buildup of U. Figure 3 shows the resulting SAT.
3.6 non-lInear dynaMIc analysIs of the Model
The above simulations demonstrate the SAT with a fixed neural 
threshold and provide an intuitive picture of network dynamics 
with growing urgency. In this section, we take a non-linear dynam-
ics approach to formally characterize this picture.
3.6.1 Two regimes for decision making
From a dynamic systems point of view, the accumulation of evi-
dence in the network is the evolution of a dynamic system from 
an initial state to an attractor corresponding to the target or the 
distractor. The evolution is determined by the structure of the 
steady states of the system (Strogatz, 2001). In our model, the slope 
parameter b, urgency signal U, and the target-distractor similarity 
g
ext
 determine the steady states of the system defined by Equation 
1. By setting the right hand side of Equation 1 to zero, we obtain 
a set of algebraic equations, the solution of which gives the steady 
states. Based on the steady state of the system, the decision process 
can be classified according to two regimes: in regime 1, the system 
evolves directly from the initial state to a single attractive stable 
steady state (see Figure 7A). In regime 2, the system is driven away 
from one unstable steady state to one of two stable steady states 
(see Figure 7B).
3.4 urGency controls the speed of transItIons throuGh 
processInG staGes wIth dIfferent effectIve tIMe constants
The above calculation of the network’s effective time constant t
eff
 
for each urgency condition explains why the model produces the 
SAT: slower buildup of U furnishes a longer time constant. But it 
does not explain how. The mechanism by which gain modulation 
controls integration time can be understood by measuring t
eff
 in 
the network without gain modulation (the fixed-gain network) for 
different values of the slope parameter bˆ. Here, the values of t
eff
 
can be thought of as successive snapshots of the network’s effec-
tive time constant under gain modulation. Consistent with earlier 
analysis (Wang, 2008), t
eff
 decreased as bˆ deviated from the value 
supporting the longest t
eff
 (Figure 5B), that is, above and below this 
optimal value, the decision variable was increasingly dominated by 
amplification and leakage respectively.
Under gain modulation, the network progresses through all 
these processing stages on each trial. As such, the decision variable 
is dominated by leakage early in the trial when urgency is low and is 
amplified later in the trial when urgency is high (see Figure 6B). t
eff
 
is thus progressively lengthened over the early part of the trial and 
contracted later on, terminating the decision process. This progres-
sion corresponds to a transition from left to right in Figure 5B. In 
effect, slower buildup of urgency allows the network to spend more 
time in processing stages with a longer time constant.
Note that our method of calculating t
eff
 is conservative. For 
example, time constants are often taken at some percentage of the 
completion of a process, such as half-life. With and without gain 
modulation (Figures 5A,B respectively), the computed values of 
t
eff
 are consistent with earlier approximations of cortical network 
time constants of up to several seconds (Wang, 2002). This would 
remain the case if t
eff
 was taken at half rise time. Note also that this 
theoretical construct is not the same thing as decision time, i.e., the 
decision variable is saturating for much of t
eff
 and a downstream 
network could read out the decision before saturation.
3.5 a proGressIon froM leakaGe to aMplIfIcatIon of the 
decIsIon varIable
The progression from leakage to amplification of the decision vari-
able with the buildup of urgency can be further understood by 
observing the activity in the fixed-gain network during the decision 
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Figure 6 | (A) Mean activation over the target- and distractor-selective 
populations (25 columns each, see Section 2) on a noise-free trial for 97% 
target-distractor similarity in the fixed-gain network for different values of bˆ. 
Light gray, medium gray, dark gray, and black curves correspond to 
ˆ ˆ ˆb b b= = =0.0275, 0.0325, and 0.04 respectively. The four upper curves 
show target activation. The four lower curves show distractor activation. 
(B) The difference between the target and distractor activation shown in A. The 
vertical arrow depicts the transition through processing stages corresponding 
to each value of (1 + U(t))·b under gain modulation.
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 7 | 6
Standage et al. Trading speed and accuracy with gain modulation
are two regions in the plane of (1 + U)·b over g
ext
. The system 
has one stable steady state in one region and three steady states 
in the other.
Thirdly, the evolution from the initial state to the stable steady 
state is determined by the structure of the steady states. In regime 1, 
the system evolves directly from the initial state to the single stable 
steady state of the target. The dynamics in the vicinity of this stable 
state determine the characteristics of the decision. In regime 2, the 
initial firing rate of the target population equals that of the distrac-
tor population (see Figure 4), so the initial state is in the vicinity 
of the two-bump unstable steady state. Therefore, the evolution 
from the initial state to the stable steady state is determined by the 
dynamics in the vicinity of the unstable steady state.
3.6.2 Regimes for accuracy and decisiveness
As described above, the decision ensues with the evolution of the 
system to the stable steady state. The dynamics in the vicinity of 
the steady state (the stable steady state in regime 1 and the unstable 
steady state in regime 2) thus determine task performance, such 
as speed, accuracy, and decisiveness (whether or not a decision 
is made). We have used signal detection theory to determine the 
decision on each trial, where the AUROC is used to estimate the 
separation of the distributions of target and distractor-selective 
activation. On any given trial, the activation of the noisy system 
fluctuates around the rates of the noise-free system. Therefore, the 
overlap of the two distributions decreases (and thus the AUROC 
increases) with the increase of the difference between the target and 
distractor-selective activation in the noise-free system. In regime 1, 
if the difference between the two bumps of the stable steady state 
is small [i.e., a low value of (1 + U)·b and a high value of g
ext
], 
the two distributions overlap too much to be discriminated and 
the network cannot make a decision. However, if the difference 
between the two bumps of the stable steady state is large enough 
to be discriminated, the network cannot make errors.
In regime 2, the system is driven away from the unstable steady 
state to one of the two stable steady states, where the difference 
between target and distractor-selective activation is large enough 
to make a decision (see bˆ = 0.04 in Figure 6). Because the system 
is sensitive in the vicinity of the unstable steady state, it may be 
driven in the wrong direction by noise, i.e., it can make errors in 
regime 2. Thus, the network is decisive, but makes some mistakes 
in regime 2, whereas it either makes correct decisions or no deci-
sion at all in regime 1.
3.6.3 The time constant of the approximate linear system
In the vicinity of the steady state, the dynamic system (Equation 1) 
can be linearized as
 
v t v c ei
t
i
i( )

= +∑ l m  (7)
where 

v  is interpreted as the mean membrane potential, v  is the 
steady state of the system, 

mi is the ith eigenvector, li is the ith 
eigenvalue, and c
i
 is the projection of the difference between the 
initial state and the steady state, defined by
 
c
v v
i
i
T
i
T
i
= −
 
 
m
m m
( )0
 
(8)
The two regimes have several notable features. Firstly, the similarity 
of the target and the distractor plays a different role in each regime. In 
regime 1, the height of the bump related to the target is higher than 
the bump related to the distractor for distinguishable tasks (g
ext
 < 1, 
see Figure 7A). The difference between the two bumps decreases 
with increasing target-distractor similarity g
ext
. In regime 2, one sta-
ble steady state has a higher bump corresponding to the target and a 
lower bump corresponding to the distractor; the other stable steady 
state has a higher bump corresponding to the distractor and a lower 
bump corresponding to the target. The unstable steady state has two 
comparable bumps, where the higher bump corresponds to the dis-
tractor and the lower bump corresponds to the target (see Figure 7B). 
The difference between the two bumps in the unstable steady state 
also decreases with increasing target-distractor similarity.
Secondly, by variation of the target-distractor similarity g
ext
 and 
the urgency signal U (or the slope parameter b), we obtain the 
bifurcation diagram of the system. As shown in Figure 7C, there 
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Figure 7 | The steady states of the system. (A) The system (Equation 1) 
has one steady state, which is stable. For U = 0 and target-distractor similarity 
gext ∈ {1.0, 0.95, 0.9}, the stable steady state has two bumps, corresponding to 
the target and the distractor. In the indistinguishable case (gext = 1), the stable 
steady state is symmetric. Otherwise, the height of the target bump is higher 
than the distractor bump. (B) The system has three steady states. Black and 
gray solid lines correspond to the stable steady states and the dashed line 
corresponds to the unstable steady state (U = 0.4 and gext = 0.97). The height 
of the larger bump in each of the two stable steady states is almost equal and 
changes slightly with gext. The difference in height of the two bumps in the 
unstable steady state increases with decreasing gext. (C) The bifurcation 
diagram of the system. The parameter domain is separated into two regions: a 
region with one steady state and a region with three steady states.
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the urgency signal is low. The system has only one stable steady 
state with activation bumps centered at the target and distractor 
columns. As the urgency signal grows, the target and distractor-
selective activation in the steady state gradually increases and 
decreases respectively (see Figures 9A–C). This changing stable 
steady state is tracked by the system and consequently the tar-
get and distractor-selective activation in the network gradually 
increases and decreases respectively before the urgency signal 
exceeds the bifurcation threshold (Figure 7C). If the urgency 
signal does not cross the bifurcation threshold, the system will 
approach the stable steady state of the final urgency signal. If the 
difference between the target and distractor-selective activation 
is large enough, the system makes a correct decision, otherwise, it 
makes no decision. Once the urgency signal exceeds the bifurcation 
threshold, the system operates in regime 2 and the stable steady 
state splits into three steady states, one unstable and two stable (see 
Figures 9D–F). At the same time, the state of the system, which 
tracks the stable steady state in regime 1 and whose target-selective 
activation is stronger than the distractor-selective activation, falls 
into the vicinity of the unstable steady state in regime 2. Driven 
away from the unstable steady state, the system evolves to one of 
the stable steady states (corresponding to the target or the distrac-
tor) and makes a decision.
In the fixed-gain network, the decision process occurs either in 
regime 1 or in regime 2, depending on the slope parameter bˆ and 
the target-distractor similarity g
ext
. For distinguishable tasks under 
gain modulation, if the urgency signal is big enough to cross the 
bifurcation threshold (0.95 < g
ext
 < 1), the progression from regime 
1 to regime 2 allows the network to begin regime 2 in a state closer to 
the target attractor than would be the case in the fixed-gain network 
with slope parameter bˆ equal to 1+ ⋅U t( ) b, where t  is the time 
at which U crosses the bifurcation threshold. This advantageous 
position of the network state formally characterizes the progres-
sion described in Section 3.5, where early noise filtering allows late 
amplification of a high-quality decision variable. As described in 
Section 3.6.3, the progression stretches the time constant t
lin
 as the 
system moves through regime 1, before contracting it in regime 2 
on the way to the stable steady state of the target or the distrac-
tor. Speed and accuracy are traded because the time constant t
lin
 
and the decision variable are larger at decision time with slower 
buildup of U (not shown). When the decision occurs in regime 1, 
the decision variable is larger at decision time with faster buildup 
of U, but accuracy is not compromised because the network can-
not make errors.
3.7 optIMal decIsIon MakInG
The above analysis shows that the bifurcation between regime 1 
and regime 2 under gain modulation puts the network in a state 
closer to the target attractor when it enters regime 2 than would 
be the case in the fixed-gain network with slope parameter bˆ equal 
to ( ( ))1+U t ⋅b at the time of the bifurcation t . This analysis sug-
gests that gain modulation by the urgency signal may produce 
more accurate decisions per unit time than the fixed-gain network. 
To investigate this possibility, we calculated the reward rate over 
a full block of 6000 trials (1000 trials for six values of target-
distractor similarity g
ext
) under gain modulation for each of the 
above rates of buildup of U. Because the urgency signal  simulates 
In regime 1, the eigenvalues for the stable steady state are nega-
tive, and the evolution of the system along the invariant manifold 
tangent to the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue 
(i.e., the one closest to 0) determines how slowly the system reaches 
the stable steady state. Therefore, the absolute value of the recipro-
cal of the largest eigenvalue can be used to approximate the time it 
takes for the system to reach the stable steady state and is defined 
as the time constant. In regime 2, we consider the time it takes 
for the system to evolve away from the unstable steady state. The 
reciprocal of the largest positive eigenvalue approximates the time 
over which the system departs from the unstable steady state of the 
invariant manifold tangent to the eigenvector corresponding to the 
largest eigenvalue. Therefore, the absolute reciprocal of the largest 
eigenvalue of the stable steady state in regime 1 and the unstable 
steady state in regime 2 depicts the time over which the system 
makes a decision and is denoted t
lin
.
For a given target-distractor similarity g
ext
, the system operates 
in regime 1 or regime 2, depending on the value of ˆ )b b= + ⋅(1 U  
(Figure 7). The time constant t
lin
 is shown for three values of g
ext
 
in Figure 8, where for each curve, the left side of the discontinuity 
shows the time constant of the stable steady state in regime 1, and 
the right side shows the time constant of the unstable steady state in 
regime 2. These curves show the same qualitative increase and sub-
sequent decrease with increasing of bˆ shown for integration times 
in Figure 5B, where more difficult tasks have longer time constants. 
The slight exceptions to these characteristics occur in the vicinity 
of the bifurcation, where the time constant is undefined because 
the eigenvector is zero at the bifurcation point, but the progression 
through processing stages with different time constants described in 
Sections 3.3 and 3.5 is clear. Notably, the time constants in Figures 5 
and 8 peak at approximately the same value of bˆ.
3.6.4 The dynamics of decision making with growing urgency
With growing urgency, decision processing under gain modula-
tion can be described according to the above two regimes. In the 
early stages of a decision, the system operates in regime 1 because 
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Figure 8 | The time constant of the steady state tlin. For each 
target-distractor similarity gext, the network operates in regime 1 with low 
(1 + U)·b and subsequently in regime 2 with high (1 + U)·b. Thus, the left 
side of each curve shows the time constant for the stable steady state of 
regime 1, and the right side shows the time constant for the unstable 
steady state of regime 2. For gext = 1, the time constant increases in regime 
1 and decreases in regime 2. For gext = 0.97 and 0.95, the time constant 
increases and then decreases in regime 1, peaking at approximately 
bˆ = 0.0325, consistent with the simulations in Figure 5. The time constant 
decreases in regime 2 for all gext.
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This finding is instructive in several regards. Earlier work showed 
that a spatially non-selective signal, variable between blocks of tri-
als, but constant within each trial, could potentially produce the 
SAT with a fixed threshold (Bogacz et al., 2006; Furman and Wang, 
2008). This approach is equivalent to setting U to a fixed value 
between trials in our model and could be instantiated by goal-
directed persistent activity in higher association cortical areas (see 
Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Wang, 2001). This mechanism is plausible, 
though we are unaware of any data showing the rate of persistent 
activity to vary systematically between trials or blocks of trials, 
as would be required. There is a growing body of data showing 
the neural encoding of elapsed time relative to learned inter-
vals (see Durstewitz, 2004), previously correlated with decisions 
(Churchland et al., 2008) and proposed here to control the SAT. 
The analysis in Section 3.6 and the calculation of reward rate in 
this section show that a within-trial signal is optimal in our model, 
though we expect within-trial and between-trial gain modulation 
to play complimentary roles in decision making and cognitive func-
tion more generally (see Section 4.4).
4 dIscussIon
Our model offers a candidate neural mechanism for the SAT. We 
propose that gain modulation by the encoding of urgency controls 
the time constant of cortical decision circuits “on the fly.” The rate 
of buildup of urgency determines how long the circuit integrates 
evidence before the decision variable is amplified. Longer (shorter) 
an estimate of the time available to respond (see Durstewitz, 2004), 
t
u
 = 1000 ms corresponds to an accurate estimate of the deadline 
and t
u
 < 1000 ms corresponds to an underestimate. We also con-
sidered an overestimate of t
u
, running a full block of trials for 
t
u
 = 1250 ms, where the trial time was still 1000 ms, i.e., U(t) never 
reaches U
max
. We also ran a full block of trials with the fixed-gain 
network for a range of values of bˆ, including several values near 
the best-performing bˆ to ensure we were not missing a finely tuned 
optimum (see Figure 10).
Because mean decision time on error trials was longer than 
on correct trials under gain modulation (see Section 4.3), we fol-
lowed the reward rate definition of Eckhoff et al. (2009), where 
penalties on error trials were considered implicit in decision time. 
Reward rate was thus defined on each trial as R = A/(DT + NDL), 
where A is accuracy (one for correct decisions and zero for errors 
or no decision trials), DT is decision time, and NDL is non-de-
cision latency. NDL subsumed the post-decision motor response 
(≈200 ms), an interval between trials (≈1750 ms), and the visual 
response delay (50 ms, see Section 2). Non-decision latency was 
thus 2000 − 50 = 1950 ms. As shown in Figure 10, reward rates 
were systematically higher in the gain-modulated network and were 
maximal when U(t) peaked at the trial deadline, i.e., of the urgency 
signals tried, an accurate estimate of the trial length was optimal 
in terms of maximizing reward (Figure 10). These findings were 
qualitatively reproduced with the reward rate definition of Gold 
and Shadlen (2002; not shown).
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Figure 9 | The evolving steady states of the network with growing 
urgency. As urgency U(t) builds up on each trial, the network undergoes a 
bifurcation from a regime with a single stable steady state (A–C, regime 1 in the 
text) to a regime with one unstable steady state and two stable steady states 
(D–F, regime 2 in the text). In the latter, one stable steady state corresponds to 
the target (solid black) and one to the distractor (gray). Target-distractor similarity 
in the figure was gext = 0.97. The dotted horizontal line (A–F) helps to gage the 
size of the bumps and has no other significance.
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multiplication of evidence permits the effect of urgency with a fixed 
threshold, so this abstract model is consistent with neural data in 
that regard. Although the SAT was not a focus of these studies, vary-
ing the rate of either time-dependent mechanism would effectively 
trade speed and accuracy.
Neural models have addressed the possible mechanisms under-
lying the above mathematical models, several of which have been 
shown to be equivalent to the DDM under biophysical constraints. 
In these models, the subtractive operation is implemented by mutual 
inhibition between neural populations selective for each option of 
a decision (Bogacz et al., 2006), a ubiquitous neural process that 
scales naturally with the number of options (Usher and McClelland, 
2001). Recurrent processing allows slow integration, where network 
dynamics yield effective time constants much longer than those 
of contributing biophysical processes (e.g., the time constants of 
synaptic receptors; Wang, 2002). This neural framework accounts 
for wealth of neural and behavioral data (see Schall, 2001; Gold 
and Shadlen, 2007; Wang, 2008). Varying a threshold firing rate will 
trade speed and accuracy in these models, but, as described above, 
it conflicts with experimental data (see Schall, 2001).
Our model trades speed and accuracy with a fixed threshold by 
exploiting the time constant of recurrent networks (Sections 3.3 and 
3.6.3). Previous work showed that biophysically based parameters 
determine an optimal processing regime (Wang, 2002; Wong and 
Wang, 2006), above and below which the time constant is monotoni-
cally shortened (Wang, 2008), dominated by inhibition and leakage 
respectively (Usher and McClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al., 2006). In 
these studies, networks were tuned to a single set of parameters that 
were chosen for best performance. This configuration was then used 
in a decision task. Unlike these models, our network employs a range 
of time constants on each trial, where speed and accuracy are traded 
according to the rate of progression from leakage to inhibition-
dominated processing (Sections 3.4 and 3.5). The rate of progression 
is determined by the urgency signal. Because the network passes 
through the same processing stages in all cases, its activity follows 
the same trajectory and decisions can be made with a fixed threshold. 
In effect, faster (slower) buildup of urgency contracts (expands) the 
progression in time, but nothing else changes.
4.2 bIoloGIcal correlates of the Model
We have used a network belonging to a class of local-circuit models 
(Wilson and Cowan, 1973; Amari, 1977) widely used to simulate 
cortical processing of continuous feature values such as spatial 
location (Camperi and Wang, 1998; Standage et al., 2005). These 
models are referred to by a number of names, including dynamic 
neural fields (Trappenberg, 2008), line attractor networks (Furman 
and Wang, 2008) and basis function networks (Pouget et al., 2000). 
The model’s foundations are based on a columnar structure where 
inhibition is broadly tuned and the probability of lateral excitatory 
synaptic contact is normally distributed (see White, 1989; Abeles, 
1991; Goldman-Rakic, 1995).
We have modeled subjects’ estimates of the passage of time 
with a piecewise linear function, where different slopes corre-
spond to different urgency conditions (Figure 2C). While this first 
 approximation is clearly simplistic, it is supported by neural data 
showing approximately linear ramping that reaches a common 
peak around the time of an anticipated event (see Durstewitz, 
estimates of the time available to respond result in slower (faster) 
buildup of the signal, so the circuit spends more (less) time inte-
grating evidence. Importantly, decision-correlated neural activation 
reaches a fixed level at decision time, consistent with neural data (see 
Schall, 2001). In effect, the encoding of urgency determines the rate 
of growth of the decision variable, instantiated by the well established 
mechanisms of gain modulation (Salinas and Thier, 2000; Salinas and 
Sejnowski, 2001) and the encoding of the passage of time (Durstewitz, 
2004; Mauk and Buonomano, 2004; Buhusi and Meck, 2005).
4.1 a neural MechanIsM for tIMe-varIant drIft dIffusIon wIth 
a fIxed threshold
Our neural model is grounded in abstract, mathematical models 
that have been instrumental in characterizing decision processes. 
Sequential sampling models are based on the premise that evidence 
is integrated until it reaches a threshold level (see Smith and Ratcliff, 
2004). Because evidence may be incomplete or ambiguous and neu-
ral processing is noisy, temporal integration provides an average of 
the evidence, preventing decisions from being made on the basis of 
momentary fluctuations in either the evidence or processing. The 
longer the integration time, the better the average (see Bogacz, 2007). 
In two-choice tasks, integrating the difference between the evidence 
favoring each option implements the DDM, known to yield the 
fastest decisions for a given level of accuracy and the most accurate 
decisions for a given decision time (see Bogacz et al., 2006). The 
DDM thus optimizes speed and accuracy for a given threshold. The 
SAT can be achieved by varying the threshold, a principle suggested 
to be instantiated in the brain (Gold and Shadlen, 2002).
The DDM has been augmented with a time-variant mechanism 
similar in principle to our use of urgency (differences between the 
models are described below). In the model by Ditterich (2006b), 
the decision threshold is lowered over the course of each trial. This 
approach is functionally equivalent to an increasing multiplication 
of the evidence as the trial progresses, demonstrated to earn more 
reward per unit time than the standard DDM in a two-choice task 
with no explicit deadline (Ditterich, 2006a). The time-dependent 
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Figure 10 | reward rate over a full block of trials as a function of the 
buildup of urgency under gain modulation (black) and the slope 
parameter of the gain function Bˆ in the fixed-gain network (gray). The 
time over which the urgency signal U(t) builds up corresponds to an 
underestimate (tu ∈ {500, 750} ms), an accurate estimate (tu = 1000 ms) and 
an overestimate (tu = 1250 ms) of the trial deadline. Error bars show SE.
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Like Equation 10, the input signals to our network model are 
subject to an increase in gain, but so is the recurrent processing of 
the decision variable. The subtractive operation is supported by 
recurrent inhibition. We may thus express our model as
 
dX
dt
U t X t U t s t s t Xt d= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ −  ≤a u( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ; ,
 
(11)
where a is a (positive) scale factor. The practical difference 
between the two models is the time of arrival of the evi-
dence subject to strong amplification. In Equation 10 (and in 
Ditterich’s model), an increasing urgency signal gives greater 
weight to later evidence than earlier evidence because only the 
input is amplified. In Equation 11 (and in our network model), 
there is a transition from a heavier weighting of the input to a 
heavier weighting of the decision variable, similar to the transi-
tion from extrinsic to intrinsic processing hypothesized to be a 
fundamental principle of local-circuit cortical processing (see 
Douglas and Martin, 2007). The urgency signal governs the rate 
of this transition.
The implications of the difference between the two models can 
be seen in Figure 11A for a noisy trial with 99% target-distractor 
similarity, where Equations 10 and 11 were given the same inputs 
received by the target and distractor columns in the network, 
U
max
 = 10 (Equation 5) and a = 1/1000. Equation 11 makes dif-
ferent decisions for different rates of urgency buildup. With faster 
buildup, the model effectively ignores later evidence (see figure 
caption). In contrast, Equation 10 is always dominated by its inputs. 
This feedforward dominance is clearly shown in Figures 11B,C, 
where the evidence for the target and the distractor was switched 
in the fourth and first quartiles of a noise-free trial respectively (see 
figure caption). An attractive feature of Equation 11 is the explosion 
of the decision variable (black curves in the figure), alleviating the 
need for fine tuning of the decision threshold, similar in principle 
to the subcritical bifurcation in the non-linear diffusion model by 
Roxin and Ledberg (2008).
While the difference between these time-variant DDMs is clear 
from Equations 10 and 11 and Figure 11, we do not further investi-
gate the novel DDM introduced by Equation 11 in this paper. Suffice 
to say, we anticipate that Equations 10 and 11 will produce similar 
results over a block of trials with constant mean evidence (within 
each trial), the dominant experimental approach to date (e.g., 
Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Thomas and Pare, 2007; Churchland 
et al., 2008). However, in trials with interference stimuli (Huk and 
Shadlen, 2005) or changing evidence (Cisek et al., 2009), results 
will differ due to the timing of amplification. It is worth noting 
that both models produce error trials that are longer than correct 
trials, but they do so for different reasons. As elegantly explained 
by Ditterich (2006b), error trials are longer than correct trials in his 
model because noise grows faster than drift rate; the lower signal-
to-noise ratio later in trials leads to more errors, so error trials are 
longer on average. Here, error trials take longer because the system 
has to cross the invariant manifold of the unstable steady state, 
which takes more time.
Our model also bears conceptual similarities with the “urgency 
gating” models of Cisek et al. (2009). In their study, mathematical 
models were compared for their ability to explain data from deci-
sion tasks with changing evidence. Under noisy conditions, the 
2004). In reaction time tasks with a deadline (Schall and Hanes, 
1993; McPeek and Keller, 2004; Thomas and Pare, 2007), such activ-
ity would provide an explicit encoding of the urgency to respond. 
Even in reaction time tasks without a deadline, it is common to 
constrain the timing of reward to discourage fast reaction times 
(Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Huk and Shadlen, 2005), motivating 
subjects to self-impose deadlines that limit the time between trials 
(and thus rewards). Neural correlates of temporal estimates have 
been described in posterior parietal cortex (Leon and Shadlen, 
2003; Janssen and Shadlen, 2005), prefrontal cortex (Genovesio 
et al., 2006), premotor cortex (Mita et al., 2009), and the mid-brain 
superior colliculus (Thevarajah et al., 2009) among other struc-
tures. These data suggest that temporal coding mechanisms can be 
more complex than linear ramping activity, but the model is by no 
means limited to the linear case. For example, in the DDM with a 
collapsing threshold, best performance was achieved with a logistic 
function of time, rather than a linear function (Ditterich, 2006b). 
Whether and how different urgency signals affect the model is left 
to a follow up study.
Neural mechanisms that may underlie gain modulation include 
recurrent processing of spatially non-selective input (Salinas 
and Abbott, 1996), voltage-dependent dendritic non-linearities 
(Mel, 1993; Larkum et al., 2004), and changes in cellular input–
output relationships caused by temporal correlations in input 
activity (Salinas and Sejnowski, 2001), background noise (Chance 
et al., 2002; Prescott and Koninck, 2003; Higgs et al., 2006), and 
other factors leading to variable conductance states (Destexhe et al., 
2003). Our method of gain modulation was meant to abstract over 
such mechanisms. Note that alternative methods of gain modula-
tion lead to similar results, including the multiplication of network 
activity by the urgency signal, and the urgency-dependent increase 
in the strength of recurrent connections (not shown).
4.3 dIfferences wIth earlIer tIMe-varIant Models of 
decIsIon MakInG
While conceptually similar to Ditterich’s (2006a) time-variant 
DDM, our network model differs in a crucial respect: the evolving 
decision variable is subject to gain modulation, not just the instan-
taneous evidence. Consider the DDM performing a two-choice 
decision task. As above, let st and sd refer to noisy evidence for 
the target and distractor respectively. At any instant, the difference 
between the evidence for each option is x(t) = st(t) − sd(t), which 
is integrated over time. Let X refer to the running total (the deci-
sion variable). The time at which the absolute value |X| exceeds a 
threshold u > 0 is the decision time. If X is positive at the decision 
time, the target is chosen. If X is negative, the distractor is chosen. 
We may therefore express the DDM as
 
dX
dt
s t s t Xt d= − ≤( ) ( ); .u
 
(9)
In the time-variant DDM (Ditterich, 2006a), st and sd are multi-
plied by an increasing temporal signal similar to the urgency signal 
U. Thus, Ditterich’s model may be expressed as
 
dX
dt
U t s t s t Xt d= ⋅ −  ≤( ) ( ) ( ) ; .u
 
(10)
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most successful model multiplied elapsed time by a low-pass filter 
of the evidence, which can be thought of as a brief spatiotemporal 
average. Notably, their data suggest that urgency controls the SAT. 
Our model provides a neural mechanism by which such control 
may be exerted.
4.4 flexIble ModulatIon of decIsIon cIrcuItry on More than 
one tIMescale
Ultimately, the modulation of decision circuitry is likely to occur 
on more than one timescale. Two such timescales are captured by 
the mathematical models of Gold and Shadlen (2002) and Ditterich 
(2006b). The former specifies a decision threshold for the DDM 
for all trials of an experiment (or some set of decisions). The lat-
ter adjusts the decision threshold on a within-trial basis, lowering 
it over the course of each trial. Although our neural model uses a 
within-trial approach, it offers a time-variant mechanism that in 
principle, can flexibly implement either or both approaches. The 
gain-modulated network began and ended each trial in extreme 
regimes dominated by leakage and inhibition respectively. These 
rough parameters account for the SAT, but modulation of cortical 
processing occurs on longer timescales as well, providing a mecha-
nism for instantiating the approach of Gold and Shadlen (2002). 
Trial-to-trial modulation could be implemented in our model by 
varying the initial strength of the network on each trial (the initial 
value of b) depending on previous choices and their reward out-
comes (Dorris et al., 2000; Thevarajah et al., 2010). Within-trial 
and between-trial modulation are both potentially supported by 
the different timescales of dopamine signals (see Schultz, 2007). 
Dopamine is extensively correlated with reward (see Schultz, 2006) 
and can modulate gain in cortical circuitry (see Seamans and Yang, 
2004). We thus envision trial-to-trial and within-trial modulation 
playing complementary roles in decision making.
4.5 suMMary and conclusIons
Models of decision circuits have demonstrated that network 
dynamics determine time constants of integration (Wang, 2002, 
2008; Wong and Wang, 2006) and that corresponding processing 
regimes are subject to modulation (Eckhoff et al., 2009). To date, 
however, neural models instantiating the DDM have used a single 
mechanism to control speed and accuracy: the difference between 
the decision threshold and the level of activity on which the decision 
variable builds (see Bogacz et al., 2006 for analysis of these models). 
If sufficiently variable, initial levels of activity could account for the 
SAT with a constant threshold. Here, we propose another, compat-
ible mechanism. In the context of sequential sampling models, the 
crucial factor is integration time, control of which is not limited 
to the difference between initial and threshold levels of activity. In 
this regard, it is instructive to distinguish between the quality of 
the decision variable and the rate of neural activation sufficient for 
the decision. For example, network dynamics force decisions in our 
model when the target and distractor are identical on average, also 
shown by earlier models (Wang, 2002; Wong and Wang, 2006). This 
property is useful because decisions often have deadlines, but the 
quality of the decision variable is low in these cases.
The notion of urgency in decision making is not new (Reddi 
and Carpenter, 2000) and is an instance of the concept of hazard 
rate, or the anticipation of an upcoming event (Luce, 1986; Janssen 
and Shadlen, 2005). A growing body of experimental data suggests 
that the encoding of time is as natural a process as the encoding of 
space (see Durstewitz, 2004; Mauk and Buonomano, 2004; Buhusi 
and Meck, 2005). When faced with deadlines, either self-imposed 
or imposed by the environment, it appears we automatically 
encode the urgency to respond. At least one empirical study has 
quantified the representation of urgency along these lines, where 
neural activity was correlated with both the passage of time and 
subjects’ decisions in a decision task, independent of the evidence 
(Churchland et al., 2008). Our study proposes a neural mechanism 
by which integration and urgency are combined: decisions are based 
on integrated evidence, but integration time is controlled by the 
representation of urgency.
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Figure 11 | Time-variant DDMs given by equations 10 (dark gray, 
modulation of the inputs) and 11 (black, modulation of the inputs and the 
decision variable). (A) A noisy trial with mean target-distractor similarity 99%. 
The DDMs received the same inputs as the target and distractor columns in the 
network with urgency building up over 1000 ms (thick curves) and 500 ms (thin 
curves). The inputs to each model were identical, including noise. The light gray 
curve shows the standard DDM (Equation 9, no urgency). Parameters are given in 
the text. (B) Noise-free trial with changing evidence for target-distractor similarity 
90% and urgency buildup over 1000 ms (solid), 750 ms (dashed) and 500 ms 
(dotted). The vertical line indicates the switching of the target and distractor stimuli 
over the last quarter of the trial. Step inputs were used (no decay) and the visual 
response delay was omitted. The light grey curve shows the standard DDM 
(Equation 9, no urgency). (C) Same as in (B), but the evidence was switched 
during the first quarter and in Equation 11 was increased from 1/1000 to 1/750.
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